The Market for Safety Regulation and the Effect of Regulation on Fatalities: The Case of Motorcycle Helmet Laws.

A-Tier
Journal: Review of Economics and Statistics
Year: 1991
Volume: 73
Issue: 1
Pages: 167-72

Authors (2)

Sass, Tim R (Georgia State University) Leigh, J Paul (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Existing econometric studies of the efficacy of motorcycle helmet laws assume that such laws are exogenously determined and may therefore yield biased results. To correct for possible selectivity bias, the authors specify and estimate a self-selection model in which the choice of having a helmet law is endogenous. Their results indicate selectivity bias exists and that if laws were randomly assigned, fatality rates for states with helmet laws would on average be less than one percent lower than for states without laws. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:tpr:restat:v:73:y:1991:i:1:p:167-72
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29