Decompositions and potentials for normal form games

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2010
Volume: 70
Issue: 2
Pages: 446-456

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce a method of decomposing a -player normal form game into simultaneously-played component games, each distinguished by the set of "active" players whose choices influence payoffs. We then prove that a normal form game is a potential game if and only if in each of the component games, all active players have identical payoff functions, and that in this case, the sum of these shared payoff functions is the original game's potential function. We conclude by discussing algorithms for deciding whether a given normal form game is a potential game.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:446-456
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29