Banking privatization and market structure in Brazil: a dynamic structural analysis

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 49
Issue: 4
Pages: 936-963

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This article examines the effects of bank privatization on the number of bank branches operating in small isolated markets in Brazil. We estimate a dynamic game played between Brazilian public and private banks. We find private banks compete with each other as expected. We also find public banks generate positive spillovers for private banks. Our counterfactual study shows that privatization substantially reduces the number of banks. The government can mitigate the effects of privatization by providing subsidies to private banks. Our model predicts subsidy policies that reduce operating costs are more cost‐effective than entry costs for isolated markets in Brazil.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:49:y:2018:i:4:p:936-963
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29