Sanctions in directed trade networks

B-Tier
Journal: Review of International Economics
Year: 2024
Volume: 32
Issue: 1
Pages: 72-108

Authors (4)

Sumit Joshi (not in RePEc) Ahmed Saber Mahmud (not in RePEc) Abhinaba Nandy (not in RePEc) Sudipta Sarangi (Virginia Polytechnic Institute)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We model three factors that affect effectiveness of trade sanctions: a country's endowment, distance between countries, and network connectivity. Our model explains several empirical observations: (i) sanctions impose costs on both sender and target; (ii) sanctions are often unsuccessful; and (iii) import sanctions, and export plus import sanctions, are more effective than export sanctions alone. We also offer extensions of our benchmark including retaliation by target, incentives of the third country to participate in multilateral sanctions or sanction‐busting, and the consequences of different centralities of sender and target in a trade network.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:reviec:v:32:y:2024:i:1:p:72-108
Journal Field
International
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29