Resale Price Maintenance Post Leegin: A Model of RPM Incentives

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Industrial Organization
Year: 2017
Volume: 50
Issue: 2
Pages: 169-179

Authors (2)

William S. Comanor (not in RePEc) David Salant (Toulouse School of Economics (...)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract The prominent Babies R Us decision (McDonough et al. v. Toys R Us, Inc., 2009) was the first to explore the economic consequences of resale price maintenance after the Supreme Court’s Leegin decision. Previously, litigation concerned the presence or absence of an agreement; but that changed with the new jurisprudence which instead emphasized the restraint’s direct anti-competitive effects. While the district court’s decision in the Babies R Us case rested on the factual circumstances of the case, it did not have before it an economic model through which those facts could be integrated. This paper offers such a model, the predicates of which are drawn from the case. The conclusions derived from the model are entirely consistent with the court’s decision

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:revind:v:50:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-016-9558-4
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29