Costly Signalling in Auctions<xref ref-type="fn" rid="FN1">-super-1</xref>

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2007
Volume: 74
Issue: 1
Pages: 173-206

Authors (2)

Johannes H&#x00F6;rner (not in RePEc) Nicolas Sahuguet (Centre for Economic Policy Res...)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper analyses a dynamic auction in which a fraction of each bid is sunk. Jump bidding is used by bidders to signal their private information. Bluffing (respectively sandbagging) occurs when a weak (respectively strong) player seeks to deceive his opponent into thinking that he is strong (respectively weak). A player with a moderate valuation bluffs by making a high bid and drops out if his bluff is called. A player with a high valuation should vary his bids and should sometimes sandbag by bidding low, to induce lower bids by his rival. Copyright 2007, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:74:y:2007:i:1:p:173-206
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29