Who Matters in Coordination Problems?

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2012
Volume: 102
Issue: 7
Pages: 3439-61

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Agents face a coordination problem akin to the adoption of a network technology. A principal announces investment subsidies that, at minimal cost, attain a given likelihood of successful coordination. Optimal subsidies target agents who impose high externalities on others and on whom others impose low externalities. Based on the analysis of the role of strategic uncertainty in coordination processes, we provide a methodology that can be used to find the optimal targets for a variety of interventions in a large class of coordination problems with heterogeneous agents. (JEL D81, D82, D83, O33)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:7:p:3439-61
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29