Border carbon adjustments and unilateral incentives to regulate the climate

B-Tier
Journal: Review of International Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 26
Issue: 4
Pages: 826-851

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

It is suggested that trade measures should be used to induce exporters to adopt more ambitious climate policy and reduce global emissions. However, a tariff and the exporter's emission tax are likely substitutes, which would undermine the rationale for these trade measures. This paper examines incentives to regulate the climate under border carbon adjustment (BCA), defined as an import duty of a magnitude determined by the difference in emission taxes between trade partners. Unlike a tariff, a BCA can induce the exporter to adopt a higher tax, suggesting that the BCA and tariff are not equally effective at targeting global emission levels and that the features of the border measure matter in assessing the effectiveness of trade policy in targeting global emissions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:reviec:v:26:y:2018:i:4:p:826-851
Journal Field
International
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29