Dynamic benchmark targeting

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2017
Volume: 169
Issue: C
Pages: 145-169

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study decision making in complex discrete-time dynamic environments where Bayesian optimization is intractable. A decision maker is equipped with a finite set of benchmark strategies. She aims to perform similarly to or better than each of these benchmarks. Furthermore, she cannot commit to any decision rule, hence she must satisfy this goal at all times and after every history. We find such a rule for a sufficiently patient decision maker and show that it necessitates not to rely too much on observations from distant past. In this sense we find that it can be optimal to forget.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:169:y:2017:i:c:p:145-169
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29