Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1992
Volume: 107
Issue: 2
Pages: 511-539

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents. More precisely, we find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups. Equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and hence the profits of the tournament administrator (usually the firm). The effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group's cost disadvantage. When the cost disadvantage is severe, these programs significantly increase effort levels (and hence profits). The opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:107:y:1992:i:2:p:511-539.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29