Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experimental Study

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2003
Volume: 111
Issue: 3
Pages: 498-529

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We investigate the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in "intergenerational games" or games in which a sequence of nonoverlapping "generations" of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t can offer advice to their successors in generation t + 1. What we find is that word-of-mouth social learning (in the form of advice from laboratory "parents" to laboratory "children") can be a strong force in the creation of social conventions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:111:y:2003:i:3:p:498-529
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29