A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2011
Volume: 71
Issue: 1
Pages: 212-223

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The paper shows that several game-theoretic solution concepts provide similar comparative statics predictions over a wide class of games. I start from the observation that, in many experiments, behavior is affected by parameter shifts that leave the Nash equilibrium unchanged. I explain the direction of change with a heuristic structural approach, using properties such as strategic complementarities and increasing differences. I show that the approach is consistent with general comparative statics results for (i) the Nash equilibrium of a game with perturbed payoff functions, (ii) the quantal response equilibrium, (iii) level-k reasoning. I also relate the structural approach to equilibrium selection concepts.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:212-223
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29