Incentives and motivation in dynamic contests

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2021
Volume: 189
Issue: C
Pages: 194-216

Authors (2)

Klein, Arnd Heinrich (not in RePEc) Schmutzler, Armin (Universität Zürich)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper uses a contest setting to analyze the provision of intertemporal incentives in organizations. Should a principal repeatedly award small prizes or give a large prize that takes past performance into account? A simple theoretical model predicts higher efforts in the latter case. An experiment confirms this prediction, but the size of the effect is smaller than expected. This result reflects two observations of independent interest. First, there is a revenge effect for laggards in repeated contests: Laggards exert higher efforts than leaders with the same first-period effort level. Second, there is an intimidation effect for laggards in the single-prize case: Laggards exert lower efforts than leaders with the same first-period effort level. Moreover, we observe polarization in laggard behavior.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:189:y:2021:i:c:p:194-216
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29