The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Supervisors

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Finance
Year: 2002
Volume: 6
Issue: 3
Pages: 397-427

Authors (3)

Charles Goodhart (not in RePEc) Dirk Schoenmaker (Bruegel) Paolo Dasgupta (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using a new database covering some 91 supervisory agencies, this paper examines how important various skilled experts are in the supervisory process and the relative usage of different kinds of such experts. We seek to explore what kind of perspective supervisors in different institutional settings may adopt: a macro-oriented perspective or a more micro-approach? The answer to this question is relevant, as there is evidence that many financial crises have been macro-induced. It is found that central banks employ more economists and fewer lawyers in their supervisory/financial stability wing than non-central bank supervisory agencies. This result would indicate that an institutional setting with direct or indirect central bank involvement is more likely to produce a macro-approach. Next, there are significant economies of scale in financial supervision, though this can be measured by several alternative variables (e.g., the relative scale of bank intermediation). Finally, there do not appear to be major economies of scope. A more complex financial system with a well-developed stock market would need both more supervisors as well as more skilled ones. JEL classification: G28, E58, O40.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:revfin:v:6:y:2002:i:3:p:397-427.
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29