Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2013
Volume: 81
Issue: C
Pages: 50-68

Authors (3)

Heifetz, Aviad (not in RePEc) Meier, Martin (not in RePEc) Schipper, Burkhard C. (University of California-Davis)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for asymmetric awareness of actions. We extend Pearceʼs (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties, and prove existence.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:50-68
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29