The law of supply in games, markets and matching models (*)

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 1997
Volume: 9
Issue: 3
Pages: 539-550

Authors (2)

Greg Engl (not in RePEc) Suzanne Scotchmer

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In large games with transferable utility, core payoffs satisfy a comparative statics property: If the proportion of one type of player increases, then the core payoff to that type of player decreases (does not increase). Markets with transferable utility satisfy a similar property: if the aggregate supply of a commodity increases, its value relative to the value of all commodities decreases. In market games, if one type of agent becomes more plentiful, his competitive payoff falls, and its decrease is engineered by a decrease in the relative value of his endowment.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:9:y:1997:i:3:p:539-550
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29