Evolving hierarchical preferences and behavioral economic policies

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2019
Volume: 178
Issue: 1
Pages: 31-52

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract This paper critically discusses the standard concept of hierarchical preferences, which presupposes that a stable system of higher- and lower-order preferences exists, wherein the former contains an individual’s fundamental purposes and values, while the latter guides everyday choices. It is argued that systems of hierarchical preferences suffer from problems similar to those of standard preferences, in terms of rationality, that they also are potentially unstable and can change, for example, in response to individual experiences. It is furthermore argued that higher-order preferences may not be coherent internally, because their different parts result from different kinds of reasoning. Finally, it is argued that behavioral economic policies, such as soft paternalism, easily can endanger the autonomy and integrity of an individual as a person.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:178:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0607-4
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29