Mortgage Default during the U.S. Mortgage Crisis

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
Year: 2018
Volume: 50
Issue: 6
Pages: 1101-1137

Authors (1)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Which theory can quantitatively explain the rise in mortgage defaults during the U.S. mortgage crisis? This paper finds that the double‐trigger hypothesis, which attributes mortgage default to the joint occurrence of negative equity and a life event such as unemployment, is consistent with the evidence. By contrast, a traditional frictionless default model strongly overpredicts the increase in default rates. This paper provides microfoundations for double‐trigger behavior in a model where unemployment causes liquidity problems for the borrower. This framework implies that mortgage crises may be mitigated at a lower cost by bailing out borrowers instead of lenders.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:jmoncb:v:50:y:2018:i:6:p:1101-1137
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29