Monetary policy under a fiscal theory of sovereign default

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2010
Volume: 145
Issue: 2
Pages: 860-868

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper examines equilibrium determination under different monetary policy regimes when the government might default on its debt. We apply a cash-in-advance model where the government does not have access to non-distortionary taxation and does not account for initial outstanding debt when it sets the income tax rate. Solvency is then not guaranteed and sovereign default can affect the return on public debt. If the central bank sets the interest rate in a conventional way, the equilibrium allocation cannot be determined. If, instead, money supply is controlled, the equilibrium allocation can uniquely be determined.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:2:p:860-868
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29