Welfare in differentiated oligopolies with more than two firms

B-Tier
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Year: 2009
Volume: 27
Issue: 4
Pages: 501-507

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Excessive differentiation in the quality or location dimension in order to soften price competition is a well-established conclusion concerning duopolistic markets. This has inspired authors to discuss policy measures that may improve welfare in a differentiated market. In the present paper, a general welfare analysis is conducted for a varying number of firms. It is shown that outcomes are almost optimal when three or more competitors are in the market. In light of this, a laissez-faire policy should be adopted. For a range of entry costs, market outcomes entail insufficient entry. Therefore, a subsidy to entry may improve welfare.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:indorg:v:27:y:2009:i:4:p:501-507
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29