Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers?

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2008
Volume: 89
Issue: 3
Pages: 375-390

Authors (4)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using the longest event window, we find that public target shareholders receive a 63% (14%) higher premium when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm (private operating firm). The premium difference holds with the usual controls for deal and target characteristics, and it is highest (lowest) when acquisitions by private bidders are compared to acquisitions by public companies with low (high) managerial ownership. Further, the premium paid by public bidders (not private bidders) increases with target managerial and institutional ownership.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:89:y:2008:i:3:p:375-390
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29