Assignment of Arrival Slots

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2013
Volume: 5
Issue: 2
Pages: 164-85

Authors (2)

James Schummer (Northwestern University) Rakesh V. Vohra (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarantee a form of property rights. This is significant since these conditions were the motivation for introducing Compression a decade ago. We give an alternative mechanism that does satisfy these conditions. It has the flavor of

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:5:y:2013:i:2:p:164-85
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29