Adverse selection without single crossing: Monotone solutions

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2015
Volume: 158
Issue: PA
Pages: 127-164

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The single-crossing assumption simplifies the analysis of screening models as local incentive compatibility becomes sufficient for global incentive compatibility. If single crossing is violated, global incentive compatibility constraints have to be taken into account. This paper studies monotone solutions in a screening model that allows a one-time violation of single crossing.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:158:y:2015:i:pa:p:127-164
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29