Cost incentives for doctors: A double-edged sword

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2013
Volume: 61
Issue: C
Pages: 43-58

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

If doctors take the costs of treatment into account when prescribing medication, their objectives differ from their patients' objectives because the patients are insured. This misalignment of interests hampers communication between patient and doctor. Giving cost incentives to doctors increases welfare if (i) the doctor's examination technology is sufficiently good or (ii) (marginal) costs of treatment are high enough. If the planner can costlessly choose the extent to which doctors take costs into account, he will opt for less than 100%. Optimal health care systems should implement different degrees of cost incentives depending on type of disease and/or doctor.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:61:y:2013:i:c:p:43-58
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29