The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2007
Volume: 74
Issue: 3
Pages: 965-980

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Formal models of elections have emphasized the convergence of party leaders towards the centre of the electoral distribution. This paper attempts to resolve the apparent disparity between the formal result and the perception of political divergence by considering a model incorporating valence. Valence can be interpreted as the non-policy basis of political judgement made by the electorate concerning the quality of political contenders. The theorem presented here shows that there is a necessary condition for convergence. The condition involves the difference in party valences and the electoral variance. When the condition fails, the low-valence parties will be forced to adopt policy positions far from the electoral centre. The inference appears to be substantiated by an empirical model of the Israel election in 1996. Copyright 2007, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:74:y:2007:i:3:p:965-980
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29