Shirking and employment protection legislation: Evidence from a natural experiment

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 107
Issue: 2
Pages: 276-280

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The Italian employment protection legislation was modified in 1990 making more costly for small firms to dismiss employees. Using a difference-in-differences estimator to compare absenteeism rates in small and large firms we find a strong increase of shirking in small firms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:2:p:276-280
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29