Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information (*)

B-Tier

Journal: Economic Theory

Year: 1996

Volume: 8

Issue: 1

Pages: 167-175

Authors (2)

Oved Yosha (not in RePEc) Roberto Serrano (Brown University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

View on IDEAS/RePEc

Abstract

We study the welfare properties of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information, establishing an equivalence between asymptotically expost individually rational and asymptotically (ex-ante, interim and ex-post) efficient equilibrium sequences.

Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information (*)

Authors (2)

Abstract

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