All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2024
Volume: 242
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a competitive market with budget-constrained buyers, an equilibrium where sellers compete with standard auctions fails to exist if the all-pay format is available. If budgets are not too limited, then all-pay auctions emerge as the preferred selling format.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:242:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524003707
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29