Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule

A-Tier
Journal: Experimental Economics
Year: 1998
Volume: 1
Issue: 1
Pages: 43-61

Authors (1)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In the evaluation of experiments often the problem arises of how to compare the predictive success of competing probabilistic theories. The quadratic scoring rule can be used for this purpose. Originally, this rule was proposed as an incentive compatible elicitation method for probabilistic expert judgments. It is shown that up to a positive linear transformation, the quadratic scoring rule is characterized by four desirable properties. Copyright Economic Science Association 1998

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:1:p:43-61
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29