Margin, Short Selling, and Lotteries in Experimental Asset Markets

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 2006
Volume: 73
Issue: 2
Pages: 419-436

Authors (4)

Lucy F. Ackert (Kennesaw State University) Narat Charupat (not in RePEc) Bryan K. Church (not in RePEc) Richard Deaves (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.251 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The robustness of bubbles and crashes in markets for assets with finite lives is perplexing. This paper reports the results of experimental asset markets in which participants trade two assets. In some markets, price bubbles form. In these markets, traders pay higher prices for the asset with lottery characteristics (i.e., a claim on a large, unlikely payoff). However, institutional design has a significant impact on deviations in prices from fundamental values, particularly for an asset with lottery characteristics. Price run‐ups and crashes are moderated when traders finance purchases of the assets themselves and are allowed to short sell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:73:y:2006:i:2:p:419-436
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24