Optimal discounts in green public procurement

C-Tier

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2024

Volume: 238

Issue: C

Authors (2)

Chiappinelli, Olga (not in RePEc) Seres, Gyula (National University of Singapo...)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

View Full Article View on IDEAS/RePEc

Abstract

We provide an auction-theoretical analysis of Green Public Procurement (GPP) as a preferential program aimed at stimulating investment in green technologies. We find that GPP incentivizes more competitive firms to invest. We also show that GPP can be an optimal mechanism for a procurer who cares about minimizing the purchasing price while triggering green investment.

Optimal discounts in green public procurement

Authors (2)

Abstract

Technical Details