Gambling in contests with heterogeneous loss constraints

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2015
Volume: 136
Issue: C
Pages: 154-157

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

I study the impact of asymmetric loss constraints on risk-taking behavior in the contest model of Seel and Strack (2013). I derive the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, the equilibrium payoffs and comparative statics about the bankruptcy risk.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:136:y:2015:i:c:p:154-157
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29