The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2014
Volume: 86
Issue: C
Pages: 330-338

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This note analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:330-338
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29