Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2009
Volume: 105
Issue: 1
Pages: 7-10

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Considering the licensing of a drastic cost-reducing innovation by an outside innovator in an n-firm Cournot oligopoly, we show that when the innovator uses combinations of fees and royalties, there are either n - 1 or n optimal licensing policies.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:1:p:7-10
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29