Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of disaster relief

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2006
Volume: 127
Issue: 1
Pages: 31-53

Authors (1)

William Shughart (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Hurricane Katrina revealed massive governmental failure at the local, state and federal levels. This commentary brings the modern theory of property rights and public choice reasoning to bear in explaining why officials failed to strengthen New Orleans's levee system despite forewarning of its weaknesses, failed to pre-deploy adequate emergency supplies as the storm approached landfall and failed to respond promptly afterwards. Its main lesson is that no one should have expected government to be any more effective when confronted with natural disaster than it is in more mundane circumstances. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:127:y:2006:i:1:p:31-53
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29