Bid coordination in split-award procurement: The buyer need not know anything

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 124
Issue: 1
Pages: 143-146

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Anton and Yao (1989) show that in split-award procurement auctions bidders coordinate their bids to sustain high buyer price. We relax their assumption that the buyer has full information about the suppliers’ production costs and restore the coordination outcome.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:1:p:143-146
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24