Reciprocal brokered deposits and bank risk

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 117
Issue: 2
Pages: 383-385

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Economic theory predicts that reciprocal brokered deposits, by enhancing deposit insurance coverage, may reduce market discipline for banks, permitting them to take more risk in various dimensions. A newly available dataset provides empirical evidence related to that hypothesis.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:2:p:383-385
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29