A strategic market game with seigniorage costs of Fiat money

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2002
Volume: 19
Issue: 1
Pages: 187-201

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption of resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:19:y:2002:i:1:p:187-201
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29