Insurgent Compensation: Evidence from Iraq

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2013
Volume: 103
Issue: 3
Pages: 518-22

Authors (6)

Benjamin W. Bahney (not in RePEc) Radha K. Iyengar (not in RePEc) Patrick B. Johnston (not in RePEc) Danielle F. Jung (not in RePEc) Jacob N. Shapiro (not in RePEc) Howard J. Shatz (RAND)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 6 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Participating in insurgency is physically risky. Why do people do so? Using new data on 3,799 payments to insurgent fighters by Al Qa'ida Iraq, we find that: (i) wages were extremely low relative to outside options, even compared to unskilled labor; (ii) the estimated risk premium is negative; and (iii) the wage schedule favors equalization and provides additional compensation for larger families. These results challenge the notion that fighters are paid their marginal product, or the opportunity cost of their time. They may be consistent with a "lemons" model in which fighters signal commitment by accepting low wages.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:3:p:518-22
Journal Field
General
Author Count
6
Added to Database
2026-01-29