Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2017
Volume: 107
Issue: 5
Pages: 420-24

Authors (3)

Abebe Shimeles (African Development Bank) Daniel Zerfu Gurara (not in RePEc) Firew Woldeyes (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We analyze data from a randomized controlled trial of two innovative anti-tax evasion schemes in Ethiopia that signal threats of audit and complimentary messages that encourage tax morale. Our results indicate that the threat of audit reduces tax evasion significantly, and its effect is higher in businesses commonly suspected of high tax evasion rates. We also find that appealing to the tax morale promotes compliance but slightly less than that of audit threat. Our results are robust to different estimation strategies and less sensitive to potential confounding factors.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:420-24
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29