Common ownership, institutional investors, and welfare

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2020
Volume: 29
Issue: 3
Pages: 706-723

Authors (2)

Oz Shy (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlant...) Rune Stenbacka (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This study evaluates the effects of institutional investors' common ownership of firms competing in the same market. Overall, common ownership has two opposing effects: (a) it serves as a device for weakening market competition, and (b) it induces diversification, thereby reducing portfolio risk. We conduct a detailed welfare analysis within which the competition‐softening effects of an increased degree of common ownership is weighted against the associated diversification benefits.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:29:y:2020:i:3:p:706-723
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29