Indivisibilities, Lotteries, and Sunspot Equilibria.

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 1993
Volume: 3
Issue: 1
Pages: 1-17

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We analyze economies with indivisible commodities. There are two reasons for doing so. First, we extend and provide some new insights into sunspot equilibrium theory. Finite competitive economies with perfect markets and convex consumption sets do not allow sunspot equilibria; these same economies with nonconvex consumption sets do, and they have several properties that can never arise in convex environments. Second, we provide a reinterpretation of the employment lotteries used in contract theory and in macroeconomic models with indivisible labor. We show how socially optimal employment lotteries can be decentralized as competitive equilibria without lotteries once sunspots are introduced.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:3:y:1993:i:1:p:1-17
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29