How to gerrymander: A formal analysis

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 1998
Volume: 95
Issue: 1
Pages: 27-49

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the “fair cake division” results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. We analyze existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, we find that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:95:y:1998:i:1:p:27-49
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29