Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2011
Volume: 72
Issue: 2
Pages: 574-582

Authors (2)

Shneyerov, Artyom (Concordia University) Wong, Adam Chi Leung (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:574-582
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29