Patent Remedies

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2016
Volume: 106
Issue: 5
Pages: 198-202

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Since the Supreme Court's eBay decision in 2006, the U.S. has employed a hybrid patent remedy system that mixes property and liability rules. When the patent owner and the infringer are competitors, the courts typically issue a permanent injunction requiring the infringer to cease its infringing activities. In contrast, when the patent owner and the infringer are not competitors, the courts often allow the infringer to continue its infringing activities so long as it pays specified ongoing royalties to the patent holder. This article studies the incentives for invention and for new product development in such a hybrid system.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:5:p:198-202
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29