Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2010
Volume: 68
Issue: 2
Pages: 731-747

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This article experimentally studies a two-stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one-stage contest. Contrary to the theory, the two-stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one-stage contest. There is significant over-dissipation in both stages of the two-stage contest and experience diminishes over-dissipation in the first stage but not in the second stage. Our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject's utility. A simple behavioral model that accounts for a non-monetary utility of winning can explain significant over-dissipation in both contests. It can also explain why the two-stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one-stage contest.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:68:y:2010:i:2:p:731-747
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29