Specific versus General Enforcement of Law.

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 1991
Volume: 99
Issue: 5
Pages: 1088-1108

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Optimal enforcement of law is examined in a model with specific enforcement effort--effort devoted toward apprehending individuals who have committed a single type of harmful act--and general enforcement effort--effort devoted toward apprehending individuals who have committed any of a range of harmful acts (a police officer on patrol, for instance, is able to apprehend many types of violators of law). If enforcement effort is specific, optimal sanctions are extreme for all acts. If enforcement effort is general, however, optimal sanctions rise with the harmfulness of acts and reach the extreme only for the most harmful acts. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:99:y:1991:i:5:p:1088-1108
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29