Cooperation under oath: A case for context-dependent preferences

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2023
Volume: 229
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The oath has been shown to improve behavior toward social objectives. Existing research suggests that the oath promotes pro-social behavior without affecting an underlying preference for cooperation. We examine whether an oath impacts behavior in the simultaneous and sequential versions of the prisoners’ dilemma and explore whether that impact could be attributed to a change of preference for the cooperative outcome. We observe an overwhelming transfer of reported strategies by oath-takers moving second from selfish (always defect) to conditionally cooperative (cooperate against cooperation by first movers). Our results lend support to the hypothesis that preferences depend on the oath-taking context.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:229:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523002549
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29