Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Year: 2012
Volume: 36
Issue: 3
Pages: 383-402

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We report results from an experiment in which humans repeatedly play one of two games against a computer program that follows either a reinforcement or an experience weighted attraction learning algorithm. Our experiment shows these learning algorithms detect exploitable opportunities more sensitively than humans. Also, learning algorithms respond to detected payoff-increasing opportunities systematically; however, the responses are too weak to improve the algorithms' payoffs. Human play against various decision maker types does not vary significantly. These factors lead to a strong linear relationship between the humans' and algorithms' action choice proportions that is suggestive of the algorithms' best response correspondences.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:dyncon:v:36:y:2012:i:3:p:383-402
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29