The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1991
Volume: 106
Issue: 2
Pages: 503-530

Authors (3)

Kevin M. Murphy (not in RePEc) Andrei Shleifer (Harvard University) Robert W. Vishny (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A country's most talented people typically organize production by others, so they can spread their ability advantage over a larger scale. When they start firms, they innovate and foster growth, but when they become rent seekers, they only redistribute wealth and reduce growth. Occupational choice depends on returns to ability and to scale in each sector, on market size, and on compensation contracts. In most countries, rent seeking rewards talent more than entrepreneurship does, leading to stagnation. Our evidence shows that countries with a higher proportion of engineering college majors grow faster; whereas countries with a higher proportion of law concentrators grow more slowly.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:106:y:1991:i:2:p:503-530.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29